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proposal and not the board’s recom-
mendation, for the purposes of this 
study, we consider shareholder votes 
that deviate from management recom-
mendations for a proposal as dissent 
– essentially, the equivalent of a parlia-
mentary vote of no confidence.
To find out, we studied a sample 
of 12,513 proposals voted on in 717 
firms in 15 Western European coun-
tries. We found that in the most lib-
eral European market economies, 
the United Kingdom and Ireland, two 
countries that follow the US model 
of independent director-led govern-
ance, shareholders vote very similarly 
as in the US. In Coordinated Market 
Economies (CME) such as France and 
Germany, however, the expressive 
function of shareholder voting looks 
equally important, although sharehold-
ers seem to be guided by a different 
corporate governance ideology.
To be sure, shareholder votes mat-
ter in Europe’s CMEs too. Even when 
there aren’t enough votes to ratify a 
measure, the votes may carry a mes-
sage. For instance, in 2015, sharehold-
ers of Deutsche Bank probably voted to 
express their discontent when a sub-
handpicked by the management and 
shareholders. But does sharehold-
er voting serve the same function in 
Western Europe? After all, corporate 
governance in Western Europe is very 
different from the US. In many north-
western European countries, for in-
stance, the law requires employee 
board representation.
Shareholder dissent 
Shareholder proposals, however, fol-
low a similar path in European com-
panies. Generally, the board offers vot-
ing recommendations to shareholders 
based on proposals made at the an-
nual shareholder meeting. They usu-
ally approve their own proposals but 
give unsolicited shareholder propos-
als a thumbs-down. Although strictly 
speaking, shareholders vote on the 
In theory, the power to vote at 
shareholder meetings is sharehold-
ers’ most powerful right. In prac-
tice, it seldom works that way. Most 
of the time, shareholder votes look 
like North Korean-style democracy, 
of seemingly little interest or value 
either to managers or sharehold-
ers. A number of researchers have 
therefore called shareholder democ-
racy a paper tiger that hasn’t turned 
out to be very useful at changing 
corporate behaviour.  
But in a recent study, my colleagues 
Steve J. Sauerwald of the University of 
Illinois at Chicago, Marc van Essen of 
the University of St. Gallen and I have 
found that an unsupported share-
holder proposal is actually more like 
a canary in a coal mine: our research 
shows that even proposals that win lit-
tle support can be an important sign 
that investors aren’t happy with the 
company’s strategy. Proposals that 
win only four per cent shareholder 
approval may in fact be an advance 
warning signal for deep-seated inves-
tor misgivings.
The value of these votes as a way to 
send a message has been document-
ed in the US, where corporate boards 
are generally made up of outsiders 
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Every year, publicly held companies ask their shareholders to vote 
on several proposals. Generally, the proposals endorsed by the board 
pass by overwhelming margins, while those the board doesn’t en-
dorse fail – also by enormous margins.
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“…like loudly cheering supporters at a 
football match, dissenting shareholders 
can have a practical impact on the 
game’s outcome.”
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Investor views 
Our findings show, for example, that 
CME investors’ view of a dominant bloc 
of shareholders is different than LME 
investors’. In LME-based companies, 
voting patterns indicate that investors 
see a major block of relational share-
holders, such as a founding family, as 
a buffer that may reduce company re-
sponsiveness to shareholders. In CME-
based companies, by contrast, a bloc 
holding is often seen as a stabilising 
factor that counterbalances the power 
of labour, for example. We suggest that 
investors in CME-based firms believe 
that long-time relational shareholders, 
such as a founding family, are keeping 
close tabs on the company’s well being. 
In addition, these investors may 
consider mixed board membership 
to be a superior model for maximis-
ing value. In these countries, there-
fore, even shareholders seem to ap-
preciate the value of incorporating the 
perspectives of more stakeholders at 
the board level.  
The level of shareholder support for 
compensation practices also varies be-
tween markets. For example, LME in-
vestors are more likely to understand 
equity-based pay of CEOs as a perfor-
mance incentive, while CME investors 
tend to see high executive pay as divi-
sive, encouraging too much concern 
about shareholders while undermining 
relationships with other stakeholders, 
and encouraging overly risky activities. 
Overall, we found that regardless 
of the nature of the company’s home 
economy, routine and strategic pro-
posals receive the lowest level of dis-
senting votes while governance and 
vote” isn’t pointless: like loudly cheering 
supporters at a football match, dissent-
ing shareholders can have a practical 
impact on the game’s outcome. In the 
case of Deutsche Bank, for example, the 
bank’s leadership team stepped down 
less than a week after the vote.
But there are differences. Because 
CMEs tend to have more joint gov-
ernance by managers, employees, 
and shareholders, shareholders in 
these countries seem more reluc-
tant to jeopardise ongoing team effi-
ciency by expressing dissent through 
public referenda. 
stantial minority voted against man-
agement’s proposal to discharge the 
board from the legal liabilities that re-
sulted from managing the firm in the 
previous year. Such proposals, which 
are routine in countries like Germany 
and the Netherlands, are largely sym-
bolic, as directors may still be held le-
gally liable for a breach of their duties 
years after shareholders have passed 
such a proposal. 
In this case, however, protesting 
investors evidently used their vote to 
express their discontent with manage-
ment. Here too, an expressive “protest 
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tion. Where LME-company sharehold-
ers see the management of a company 
as their agent, CME-shareholders see 
the company as the product of team-
production, and vote accordingly. 
This article draws its inspiration from the 
paper Expressive Shareholder Democracy: 
A Multilevel Study of Shareholder Dissent 
in 15 Western Countries, written by Steve 
Sauerwald, J. (Hans) Van Oosterhout 
and Marc van Essen, and published in 
the Journal of Management Studies 53:4 
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As a legal matter, LME-based com-
panies are institutions that exist to 
serve their shareholders. CME-based 
companies, by contrast, are believed 
to exist to meet the goals of a variety 
of stakeholders, including employees. 
Second, our analysis of the contrasts 
between LME and CME votes suggests 
that the expressive function of dissent-
ing votes is also powerful throughout 
Europe, despite the fact that European 
shareholder meetings resemble North-
Korean style democracy just as much 
as the shareholder meetings of US 
firms. Managers would therefore do 
well to pay attention to the reactions 
of the minority investors who vote for 
proposals not sanctioned by the board.
In sum, our work suggests that 
European executives should not be 
complacent about shareholder chal-
lenges despite low numbers of protest 
votes in CME-based companies, as even 
soundly trounced proposals may raise 
serious issues. It would be best to un-
derstand shareholder voting as a politi-
cal process, and to interpret voting out-
comes as polls that gauge how the firm 
is doing in the eyes of shareholders.
As with citizens in democratic elec-
tions, shareholders’ votes seem to be 
guided by their view of the corpora-
“…our research suggests that it would be a 
mistake for European companies to blindly 
adopt the US model.”
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shareholder proposals receive the 
highest. This suggested to us that gov-
ernance issues are most important to 
dissatisfied shareholders. 
Further, the insignificant differ-
ence in market-to-book ratios be-
tween companies suggests that rela-
tive performance is not really a cause 
of dissent. However, the correlation 
between dissent and the level of free-
floating ownership suggests that 
shareholder dissent is a more impor-
tant mode of expression for outsider 
investors than for long-term investors 
who have stronger internal channels 
of communication.   
Greater democracy 
Many shareholder advocates in Europe 
have asked for more shareholder de-
mocracy in public firms. The European 
Union has also moved to make more 
shareholder democracy a priority in 
the European market. However, our re-
search suggests that it would be a mis-
take for European companies to blindly 
adopt the US model. First, the differ-
ence in corporate governance between 
CME-based and LME-based companies 
is not arbitrary, but reflects different 
ideas of the ownership and purpose 
of the corporation.
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